In Southeast Asia, Muslims constitute a significant portion of the community. More than 243 millions out of about 581 millions of the total Southeast Asian population are Muslim. Although geographically Muslim communities concentrate in two countries -Indonesia and Malaysia-there are Muslim groups in every southeast c ountry. Considering their number in the region, the situations of Muslim communities in Southeast Asia will inevitably influence the political dynamics of the region. Three main points will be elaborated in the following discussion. Firstly, I would like to explain the chronology of the conflicts and at the same time reveal their intractable natures. Secondly, I will analyze the cause of the conflicts in term of security dilemma: whether the conflicts were triggered by real or assumed causes? Thirdly, I will address the specific "Islamic" factors of the conflicts, which have been denied by Southeast Asian governments to be among the feature of the conflicts, and propose a more appropriate approach to this issue in order to reduce the intractability of the conf licts.
State
To put it simply, intractable or protracted conflict is any conflict which is very difficult to solve. Among other explanations, Bercovitch (2003) lists some characteristics of intrac table conflicts which include:
1. In terms of actors, intractable conflicts involve states or other actors with a long sense of historical grievance, and strong desire to redress or avenge these. This point is clearly applicable to the armed conflicts among Muslims in Southeast Asia. Although these conflicts are commonly seen as problems of post-colonial Southeast Asian states, the historical root of the conflicts were dated back to the colonial or even pre -colonial times. Typically, all of Muslim groups involved in armed conflicts were independent religious -political community-in the form of kingdoms, or vassalage-which were torn by Western colonialism and finally ended up as parts of secular states (Christie, 1996: 129 -137 ).
In the Philippines, Muslim preachers arrived in the archipelag o as early as the 13th century. Because of the typical characteristic of the spreading of Islam in Southeast Asia, which was without violence and without state coercion behind it, Muslims were able to live in peaceful coexistence with native people for cen turies. Only after the arrival of European power, did Muslims launched massive campaigns to proselytize local people as many as possible (George, 1980: 19 -20 (Islam, 2003: 96 -200 (Christie, 1996: 140-145 (Christie, 1996: 167-168) .
In terms of duration, intractable conflicts take place over a long period of time.
Current armed conflicts in Southeast Asia also went through a stretched period of time. The current armed movements among Moros in the Philippines started in 1968 when Musli m Moros declared Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) as a reaction against the more-and-more repressive policies of Marcos's administration. The government responded by co -opting elite Moms into the high level of government administration, which generated discontents among younger generation. This young generation then went to form Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari.
MNLF was in constant conflicts with the Philippines authority until 1976 when-mediated by Organization of Islamic Confe rence (0IC)-the two parties signed Tripoli agreement, in which Marcos's administration promised an independent area of Muslim Mindanao which included 13 provinces and nine cities in return of MNLF withdrawing its demand of a complete independence. This agreement generated another disappointment among younger and educated generation, which then went to form Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Hasyim Salamat to continue pursuing Moro as an independent region. Another break up from MNLF occurred in ea rly 198os, when a faction under Abdul Razak Janjalani split and formed the infamous Abu Sayyaf group (Islam, 2003: 200 -207) . In Aceh Indonesia, the armed movement against Indonesian government started in 1953 when the Acehnese people -under the leadership of Mohammad Daud Beureueh -joined Darul Islam rebellion against Indonesian central government demanding an Islamic independent state in four provinces (the others were West Java, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan). Darul Islam movement in Aceh ended when Daud Beureueh accepted Jakarta concession of a special province for Aceh under the Indonesian Republic. But the armed movement started again in 1976 under the banner of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or The Independence A ceh Movement) led by Hassan di Tiro, who then lived in Sweden since 1979, because of the domination of Javanese people in Acehnese political and military administrations (Christie, 1996: 156 -158 (Christie, 1996: 186-189) . Recently, in the post-9/11 era Southern Thailand showed a heated escalation when several clashes occurred between Muslim Patani groups and the Thai military authority. A number of terrorist attacks against military as well as civil targets have lured analysts to think of Al-Qaeda operating in the region. Heavy handed responses from the Thai government were also infamous, especially in October 2004 Tak Bhai tragedy when 78 Muslim Patani were suffocated to death after being arrested and put in trucks by the Thai military. Meanwhile armed resistance among Muslim Arakan started in 1948 when Muslims gained control militarily in Northern Arakan in a jihad movement while the central government was preoccupied with national consolidation. In the central government was able to put an end to this rebellion. Since then the situation of political movement among Arakanese Muslim was rather dissidence instea d of rebellion. But since Myanmar, then Burma, military tended to perceive all Muslims as potential threats there were many political and military repressions which triggered more resistances. In its report, Amnesty International alleged Myanmar military r egime as doing ethnic cleansing against the Muslim minority (Amnesty International, 2004), Armed conflicts among Muslim in Southeast Asia were not only caused by economic or political interests. These conflicts were fiercely fought because these Muslim communities felt their religious and ethnic identities were threatened. In the Philippines, no t only did the central government exploited economically the wealth of the southern region (George, 1980: 107-128) , but also carried mass migration of Catholics from the densely populated north region, which eventually made Muslims virtual minority in Mind anao (Islam, 2003: 201 those involved desired such an outcome. The tension and conflict were caused by the nature of inter -state relations, where states live in selfhelp anarchy situation of international politics, trapped in arm -races and saw their own conduct as benign intention of self defense purposes while perceiving others doing exactly the same things as threatening. In other words, security dilemma is a situation where conflicts could be produced between two powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort (Collins, 2000: 4) . Although it was initially to descri be inter-state politics, scholars also apply the concept of security dilemma for intra -state conflicts. Intrastate conflicts might be caused by security dilemma when a party's non-expansionist or self-defensive action (state or intra -state group) is perceived by others as threatening their, these others, security. The essence of security dilemma is a tragedy that is unknown to either participant that their incompatibility, while appearing real, is actually illusory. This means-we need to bear in mind -that when the conflict is caused by deliberate actions by any party to threaten or to harm others then this is not a security dilemma situation. In the Philippines's case, the MNLF was formed as a reaction to the government's co-optation of Moros elites, by giv ing them high positions in governmental administration. This co -optation, in turn, was intended to contain mounting resentments among Moros after "Jabadilah Massacre," when the Philippines army trained a group of Muslim to be deployed in borderline -conflict with Malaysia but-with unknown reason-these trainees were murdered. Seen from the latter context, Moro armed resistance against the Philippines was not a product of security dilemma, because government action indeed harmed Moro community. Seen from the former context, however, the antagonism was possibly caused by security dilemma, because MNLF resentment was two -fold, i.e. toward the co-opting government as well as toward the co -opted elites. The consent of Moro elites to accept government's concession w as multiinterpretable. On the one hand it could be an opportunistic decision for the elites' own interests; or on the other hand it could also be a moderation policy to the Moros' struggle. This situation was repeated again, when MNLF sign an agreement wi th Manila, and triggered the formation of the more militant MILF and Abu Sayyaf groups. In Indonesia, when the Independent Aceh movement (GAM) started revolting against Indonesian government, the security dilemma situation is more apparent. When the revolt was declared in 1976, the main reason was Jakarta's systematic exploitation of Aceh's rich resources, and undermining Acehnese Islamic identity. Meanwhile from the government point of view, strict and centralistic political and military policies were intended to ascertain and maint ain the authority of the central government and to prevent any subversive movement, due to the government and the military trauma of Muslim insurgence. The similarly strict policies were also applied, at the time, to other regions which have historical rec ord of armed revolt against the central government. This was a perfect example of intra -state security dilemma, when Indonesian government wanted to make sure that their sovereignty and authority were in place by applying strict policies in provinces which have historical records of armed insurgences, the policy was perceived from the provinces point of view as an unjustified systematic exploitation and undermining of their resources and identity. Furthermore, Indonesian government's respond to the revolt made the bad situation worse. To uproot GAM movement -which was actually a semi-military militia group whose members are live among wider Acehnese society-Indonesian military took heavy handed actio ns especially in 1980s when it applied martial law and treated the whole Aceh province as a Region of Military Operation. This un -proportional military measure made further resentment among Acehnese people, and made GAM's accusation that Jakarta was unjust ifiably colonizing Aceh become more real. Rather than reducing the resistance, the military operation indeed strengthened GAM's position among Acehnese. In Southern Thailand, where the armed conflicts are much smaller in scale compared to the Philippines a nd Indonesian cases, the security dilemma also shadowed the conflict, especially with regard to the more recent phase of the conflict. After in dormant for quite a while, armed conflict in Southern Thailand broke again following the war on terror declared by the US against Al-Qaeda and its networks. The Tek Bhai incident in 2004, for instance, was another typical plot for an intra state security dilemma. The Thai government, a close ally of the US in Southeast Asia, conducted security operation to tract and crack-down the existing al-Qaeda networks or operatives in the country -that is, in predominantly Muslim provinces-which was perceived by Muslims as another package of oppressive policies against Muslims. There was, in fact, a three-partite conflict. On the one hand, there was a purposive security operation against Al -Qaeda networks, and on the other hand the was also a side effect of escalation among Patani Muslim in general, because of the way Thai military carried out its operation. The indiscriminate nature of the security operation, in turned, was caused by its very objective, namely to unearth a shadowy and underground organization whose members were living among, and difficult to be differentiated from, the wider Muslim society.
Lastly in Myanmar, the conflict between Muslim Rohingya and the Myanmar Government apparently involved no security dilemma. In fact, after a struggle for independence state failed in Arakan region, Rohingya Muslim pursued for a greater autonomy for their community. However Myanmar military junta deliberately persecuted Rohingya people along with other minority groups. Because ethnically they are Bengali stock, many Rohingya people tried to cross the border as refugees to neighboring Bangladesh.
Islam: The Denied Factor
In discussing armed conflict among Muslim in Southeast Asia, it is interesting to note how the governments tended to deny "Islam" as among the factor involved in the conflicts. In the Philippines, in an effort to build dialogue between conflic ting parties, the government referred to Muslim Mows only as a cultural, but not as a religious, group (George, 1980: 185-186) . In Indonesia during the New Order Regime the Indonesian government called Free Aceh Movement as a Security Disturbance Movement (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan), which implies that the movement was no more than a band of criminals or gangsters and not a bit represented Muslim Aceh. In Thailand, the authority tended to see conflicts with Southerners as merely security problems and though t as if these conflicts could be solved with military approach (International Crisis Groups, 2005) . Even in Myanmar, in response to a report of human rights abuses, the government stated that it was not in conflict with any religious minority groups (Human Rights Watch, 1997) . In the first glance, the policy to exclude religious factors from the agenda to solve the conflicts seemed smart. Firstly, the governments did not want to be trapped in theological issues. Secondly, they did not want to trigger sentim ents from the whole Muslim communities. In a closer observation, however, this was a miscalculated strategy which was caused by these governments' ignorance of Islam and Muslims. By setting aside the Islamic factors, the governments missed one of the very sources of energy, motivation, and inspiration of the insurgencies. Islam had played, at least, three simultaneous factors for those Muslim insurgences. Firstly, Islam gave a sense of historical, cultural well political identity. For these Muslim groups, Islam is not only a set of beliefs and rituals, but also a historical, socio -cultural and political framework by which they could refer to themselves as well as to differentiate themselves from other people. More importantly, Islam gave these people moral and spiritual legitimacy of what they are and what they have done. In short, Islam is the political ideology of these insurgencies. Thirdly, Islam also provided an effective means for a mass mobilization. Indeed, although they share the sufferings and discontents of the whole ethnic communities, the insurgence groups were always initiated by a small number of people trying to pursue a violent way to end the political oppression and discriminations the communities had endured. Usually, they would justify their conduct using religious symbols and languages. In Islam there is a doctrine on "struggle" or Jihad. By assigning their struggle as jihad, these insurgence groups tried to encapsulate their struggle not primarily as political movements but rather as mo ral and spiritual ones against not only a political power and institutions, i.e. the states, but rather against the enemy of God. The abstraction of political interests using religious languages and values was effective in mobilizing wider support from the community. This was because a religious language was more familiar for the ordinary people in the Muslim communities. Explaining the insurgencies in terms of jihad against secular and antiMuslim states was simpler and easier for the people to understand than describing them in political, judicial or economic terms. Moreover, in expressing their struggle in religious terms, insurgence groups were able to put higher values to their causes and to what they were doing. In political and military terms, a strug gle could have two possible ends: success or fail. Therefore, for sure, there are many people who did not support the insurgencies because they did not want to risk themselves to become losers. But in term of jihad the two possible ends equally mean succes s: when you win you would be the victors, when you die you would ascend straight away to the eternal Paradise. Lastly, Islam provided for the insurgences an effective means of internationalizing their cases. In Islam there is a concept of supra -state universal Muslim brotherhood or Ummah, in which Muslims across the globe are described to constitute a single religious community bounded by a common faith and religious identity. Furthermore, it was said that Muslim community should help each -other similar to a single human body, when any single part of the body was hurt the whole body would feel the pain. These doctrines were other valuable ammunition provided by Islam to the insurgencies. The benefit was political, moral, and material. Politically, these insurgence groups were able to appeal helps from international Muslim organizations or communities. An intervention from Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was able to put pressure to the Philippines government to sign an agreement with the MNLF. Conflict in Southern Thailand was also utilizi ng international Islamic sentiment for their cause, and attained a considerable success. The conflict in Patani has become a serious concern of OIC, and even the Thai government sent their delegates to OIC headquarter in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) to explain the Thai government programs for Southern provinces as well as to build a better relationship with OIC and its members. Morally, continuous contacts with other Muslim insurgence movements in the world gav e Muslim insurgents in Southeast Asia a constant moral and psychological support and motivation to continue their struggle. And finally, utilizing Islamic sentiments Muslim insurgents in Southeast Asia were able to get financial support from international Muslim communities, especially from richer countries in the Middle East. Given that there were many factors Muslim insurgents took from Islam-as religion, political ideology, and cultural system -it seems unwise for the governments to exclude Islamic factor s from the agenda to solve the conflicts. As was mentioned earlier, the decision to deny Islamic factors was due to the governments' ignorance of Islam and Muslims. Typically, they regarded Islam as a single entity, which is unitarily or equally professed by all Muslims. In other words, they tended to see Muslims as unitary groups which profess exactly the same system. These governments were afraid, therefore, that by addressing the insurgencies as "Islamic" they would provoke a confrontation against the wh ole Muslim communities. This was only partially correct. It was correct in the sense that if the governments address the insurgencies as Islamic, they would face the whole Muslim communities. But it was also incorrect in the sense that Muslims and Islam are never monolithic or unitary entities. Although founded upon common basic principles, in fact th ere are many schools and sects in Islam, caused by differences in interpretation of the teaching of the religion. Some people emphasize certain aspects, others emphasize other factors. Consequently, there are always pluralities among Muslim communities. Th e armed struggle waged by insurgent groups does not necessarily represent the intention of the whole Muslim communities-although these groups would say so. There were many-or using common-sense there would be the majority -Muslims who did not agree with a violent way to solve the problem.
Furthermore, theoretically, the relations between religion and social dynamics are always twofold: on the one hand, religious doctrine might be prescriptive, in the sense that it dictates what the believers could or could not and should or should not do; o n the other hand religious doctrine might also be legitimative, that is, it is used by the believers to legitimize what they have done (Fermata, 2006) . As long as the insurgencies are concerned, the most possible case was that Islamic doctrines were utilized by the insurgence groups to legitimize their causes. It does not mean, however, that this was illegitimate or unjustified acts. This is a very normal, hence legitimate, way of being religious: to legitimize what people are doing with their moral and spiritual values. Yet it does tell us that the religious interpretations of the insurgent groups -to solve the communal or religious problem through armed resistance -does not necessarily represent, or are shared by, the whole Muslim community. What the Southeast Asian government can do is to identify the main characteristic of the religious interpretations of insurgent groupswhich are likely jihadist or violent in character. The next step is to find out another interpretation which is more dialogical among the community. Finally, they may promote this moderate group as the representative of Muslim communities to negotiate Muslim demands and interests. It may be sound complicated to differentiate between moderate and radical groups among Muslim communities, but for students of Islamic studies there are some formulas to simplify the complexities and to enable to recognize the characteristics of Muslim organizations and movements from their labels and jargons, to make it as easy as for students of political party studies to identify parties' orientations and programs from their ideological labels using rights and left diagram. Basically, the whole complex of modern Muslim politics were and are products of encounters between Islamic traditions and western civilizations and powers, therefore the complexities in Muslim political strands could be simplified by classifying them according to their relative positions and attitudes toward western world. Initially, in the late 19th and early loth centuries, there were three main schools: Firstly, Secularists who adopted wholeheartedly almost all western ideas and perceived Islam merely as ruins of outmoded past; secondly, Modernists who were receptive to some western inspirationseconomy, educations, sciences and technologies etc. -but still committed to Islamic values and tried to formulate a synthesis out of them; and thirdly, Revivalists who saw the West as enemy and threat to Muslim and Islam, and they tried to revived -and sometimes reinvented-Islamic traditions to fights against the West. In the second part of loth century these mainstreams evolved into newer versions and also created new hybrid strands as the results of interactions and combinations.
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Insurgencies among Muslims in Southeast Asia are similar with, yet also different from, armed insurgencies in general. Similarly, these revolts were caused by accumulative resentments towards governments policies with regard to their ethnic or communal gro ups. Because these discriminative policies influence almost every single aspect of the people's communal life, they could only be understood and explained in rather abstract and general terms, usually using cultural and/or religious languages. It means tha t the problems were not just about interests, but also pertained with the groups' identities. When the conflicts started to involve intangible issues, such as values and identities, they became intractable conflicts. At this point, beyond the complexities of the protracted conflicts, the governments need to pay serious attention to the initial cause of the conflicts, namely the discriminative policies. The government should improve the disadvantaged conditions of the Muslim communities as t he starting point to solve the conflicts. Muslim insurgencies, however, also have specific character which derived from the special features of the religion of Islam. In this respect, Islam provided three simultaneous facilities for the insurgents.
It serves as religious-political ideology by which they legitimize their movements; it also provides an effective language for massmobilization by identifying the conflicts not as political or economic but religious struggles or jihad; and lastly Islam has enabled the insurgents to internationalize their cases, to get political, moral and material supports from international Muslim communities and organizations. For this point, the Southeast Asian Government should identify the violent religious interpretations of the insurgence groups, find more moderate and non -violent interpretations among Muslim communities, and promote these moderate groups as the representative of Muslim communities. (Note: this is, of course, not as simple as it seems to be. Sometimes, Muslim people are facing a complicated choice, between radical but clean groups and moderate but corrupt one-as happened in Palestine).
